









The spread of COVID-19 has had a global impact, with the human toll being significant, and 
with the the economic cost being unquantifiable. With regards to business and contractual 
relationships, legal liabilities owed to disruption, cancellations, or to the imposed halt of 
everyday life are perhaps the most notable. This article starts by examining frustration in 
English, US and continental contract law in relation to cases where the circumstances have 
changed due to unnatural events such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It then moves on to 
discuss the impact of Covid-19 on insurance, in particular business interruption, travel and 
general liability insurance. The likelihood of success of future claims, the scope of coverage, 
together with the meaning and interpretation of  the term “force majeure” and how this will 
relate to exclusions from insurance coverage is discussed. Valuations methods are also 
considered and evaluated with a view to protect the policyholder as his business interruption 
policy is a contract of adhesion not having left him any room to negotiate. In addition, possible 
interpretations to be followed by courts in future claims and liability for catastrophic risks and 
methods of compensation are examined and conclusions on the role of insurance in the COVID-
19 pandemic are drawn. 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Coronaviruses are defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a large 
family of viruses that cause illnesses ranging from the common cold to more severe 
diseases. In late 2019 and in early 2020 , as reported by the WHO and in the media, a 
"new strain" of a novel coronavirus has been identified. Accordingly, many nations 
have made formal declarations  that a public health emergency exists. Later the situation 
was elevated to a pandemic.  
As the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) continues to spread across the 
world, and governments and health authorities try to defeat it, its impact on commercial 
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and insurance arrangements is a serious concern for businesses. Commercial companies 
and individual actors are looking to rely upon “force majeure” provisions both in their 
commercial and insurance contracts to either temporarily suspend their performance 
obligations under contracts and protect themselves against failures to perform what is 
stipulated as per the contract, as well as claim from their insurers on the basis of their 
insurance policies, be it general, business interruption or any other type of insurance. 
Individuals also having to amend or cancel their travel be it personal or professional, or 
those having to travel will be wondering about the scope of their travel insurance cover. 
With regards to commercial contracts and contract interpretation, whether 
COVID-19 constitutes a “force majeure” event depends on the definition of “force 
majeure” in each specific contract. The more detailed the wording of the “force 
majeure” clause the biggest the certainty as to what is covered . Usually, “force 
majeure” clauses have been construed to include acts of God (e.g. earthquakes, volcanic 
eruption, flood or cyclone), war, strikes, embargoes, certain government actions, and 
abnormally bad weather. However, the description of “force majeure” can be exhaustive 
or non-exhaustive and where it may contain examples the list may expressly refer to 
“epidemics”, “pandemics” or “acts of government” or exclude events from the notion of 
“force majeure”.  
In the context of COVID-19, one needs examine if the term “epidemics”, 
“pandemics”, or equivalent language constitute express examples of an  “force majeure” 
event or whether it is excluded. If no express reference exists, a contractual party may 
argue that an epidemic or pandemic is an “act of God” or that it falls within the 
definition of  “force majeure”. Government measures such as quarantines or circulation 
and travel restrictions, may constitute “acts of government”. Courts will usually 
interpret “force majeure” clauses within the context of any given specific contract. 
In England, where modern contract law emerged around commercial sales as a 
paradigm, especially commodity sales via successive contracts, there are, comparatively 
speaking, strict rules allowing termination of contract for breach, to allow the multiple 
parties to know better where they stand so that they may then renegotiate a solution, or 
not. Although pure commercial impracticability or price fluctuation is itself never a 
trigger, however in the current COVID -19 circumstances whereby legal impossibilities 




a link to very extreme consequences where frustration is to be established and where an 
extra “force majeure” or hardship clause might be included or added to the contract.  
 Continental law by contrast is allowing commercial impracticability, 
potentially triggering even court adjustment rather than termination, due to frustration 
and “force majeure”. In the continental law jurisdictions, the case law has shown that 
this is possible  especially during or after extreme economic dislocation, like world 
wars, and it is predicted that the same will occur in the case law to be developed as a 
result of the present pandemic, as in continental law court-triggered adjustment of the 
contract to the new circumstances, is allowed as per the Civil Code's general principle 
of good faith which exists in all continental jurisdictions. In future litigation and 
arbitrations,  it will be interesting to see how state courts and arbitrators end up dealing 
with assertions of changed circumstances around the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as 
the original Civil Code concept of non-imputable legal impossibility of performance. 
 
 With regards to insurance contracts, cover for coronavirus-related losses and 
costs may be available under various commercial insurance policies, most notably, 
those that provide business interruption and contingent business interruption coverage. 
Businesses that will have gone into lockdown need ascertain whether their insurance 
cover includes business interruption due to a pandemic and need examine their 
insurance policies so as to consider possible amendment in the wording prior to 
upcoming renewal dates. The wording of insurance policies may differ depending on 
the level of cover negotiated and paid for. In addition, general liability insurance will be 
invoked to provide coverage against third party claims of property damage or bodily 
injury, where a third party claimant alleges that an individual contracted COVID-19 due 
to some act taken or not taken by the insured company. General liability insurance will 
also be used to get insurance coverage for government-mandated shutdowns and any 







II. Frustration in Contract Law and the Notion of Changed Circumstances  
 
Under English law  the doctrine of frustration developed out of distinct 
categories of mainly physical impossibility of performance. Early cases allowed an 
excuse from performance obligations through the insertion of an “implied condition” or 
a term as to the continued existence or future occurrence of a state of affairs.
1
 Later on 
as case law, contract law itself and the doctrine of frustration evolved the true rationale 
for excuse from performance was attributed to and depended on the justice or equity of 
each case.
2
 English law of contract embraces a vivid reluctance to allow discharge by 
frustration. Such an approach embodies also the position followed that commercial 
impracticability of performance cannot serve as an excuse under English law, for the 
latter is rigid in recognising frustration under strict criteria. Even where all obstacles 
might appear surpassed,  a party seeking the application of the doctrine of frustration to 
his case may not be satisfied in his claim, and this is so in English contract law, as it 
emanates from the body of case law that has developed arguing that a contract cannot be 
frustrated by foreseen or foreseeable events, which is interpreted in that the party 
seeking application of the doctrine of frustration should have provided against those 
events.  
 
This strict position and attitude followed by both the English law and the 
English courts seem to be related to the severe and strict effects that follow the 
occurrence and recognition of the existence of frustration, which is the automatic 
termination at the time of the frustrating event, without even the requirement or 
obligation for the party affected by the circumstances leading to frustration to give 
notice to the other party, who can also invoke the doctrine and  in doing so may also 
have a windfall gain without the courts being in a position to intervene so as to adjust 
the parties’ contractual obligations instead 
of terminating them. Hence, the English law of frustration which has developed out of 
certain categories of impossibility of performance of the contract has been justified and 
supported by both the law per se as well as by the body of case law that has developed 
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around it, on the basis of the objective of contract law to satisfy the intentions of the 
parties. It follows from the above that the scope of application of the doctrine of 
frustration under English law is very limited, and this view is further justified  by the 




Contrary to this approach the U.S. law recognises that the judicial function is to 
determine whether, in case of exceptional circumstances, justice requires a departure 
from the general rule that a promisor bears the risk of increased difficulty. This 
approach of U.S. law is also depicted in the continental law jurisdictions, which have 
followed a different approach than that of English law and which in their majority 
recognise the possibility of relief in the event of extreme economic dislocation, if it 
follows that as an exception to the rule established in the various Civil Codes that the 
promisor becomes liable for damages if performance becomes impossible for any cause 
attributable to him, the promisor will not be liable for non-attributable performance, 
such as due to an act of God or another event beyond his or her control.
4
 Impossibility 
has long been interpreted as including not only physical impossibility, but also 
impossibility in the light of “common sense in society”. Thus, a promisor could be 





 On the other hand, the “doctrine of changed circumstances” has proven more 
popular in providing relief where costs of performance have increased dramatically and 
also where the market price of the subject matter of the contract has fluctuated widely. 
The doctrine which was developed by many continental jurisdictions and prescribes as 
prerequisite the existence of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the basis of 
the contract. In Japan, academics and the Courts drawing on German legal theory came 
to recognized the doctrine of change of circumstances towards the end of World War II. 
Similarly, the Greek legislator, to begin with, even before many of the other continental 
law legislators and even before the Community legislator, has recognised the need for a 
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provision protecting the weak party to a contract. For the Greek legislator, a party to a 
contract needs protection when the contract concluded bears consequences that are 
particularly intolerable to him. Thus, pursuant to the provision of article 388 of the 
Greek Civil Code, one of the parties is given the opportunity to not be legally bound to 
perform under a contract which, due to unforeseen events that may have evolved into an 
extremely burdensome undertaking, as circumstances have changed drastically; and as a 
result of the change in circumstances to be able to invoke and argue that there is 
frustration of the contract. This is a particular manifestation of the principle of good 
faith, as elaborated in Greek contract law
6
 and in the body of case law developed,
7
 
which stresses the legislator's willingness to protect the party to a contract from 
irreparable harm in the event of adherence to the contract even if circumstances have 
changed in a drastic manner due to unforeseen events. The conditions for the 
application of article 388 of the Greek Civil Code are: a) the existence of a contract 
between the parties; b) the subsequent, unforeseen and extraordinary change of 
circumstances, in which, in the light of good faith and conduct, the parties supported the 
conclusion of the contract. It has been held that the extraordinary reasons for 
terminating or adjusting the contract are those which could not have taken place in the 
ordinary course of business, which could not be predicted in advance and which is 
caused by unusual and extraordinary events that result to a change of circumstances.
8
 
These extraordinary grounds must affect events on which both parties adhered to so as 
to conclude the contract.
9
 The events must take place after the contract has been 
concluded; c) when there has been a disruption of the balance between the parties. The 
purpose of Greek law is the fairness of the contracts and in order to achieve this purpose 
the fundamental doctrine of  'pacta sunt servanda' , dictating that concluded contracts 
need be abided with and performed, as depicted in article 361 of the Greek Civil Code is 
set aside so as to enable one of the parties to frustrate the contract due to unforeseen 
change of circumstances that justify the frustration of the contract and the non-
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The potential for greater flexibility resulting from the doctrine of changed 
circumstances in principle permitting court adjustment explains its greater readiness to  
be applied compared to the law of frustration in England.
11
 Contract law academics 
Atiyah and Summers had contrasted two broader “varieties of formality” in England 
and the U.S,, i.e. “enforcement formality” denoting the degree to which legal rules and 
other norms are actually translated into practice and “truth formality.”denoting the 
degree to which a legal system identifies “true facts” to which legal rules and other legal 
phenomena are related, and they have suggested that all legal systems strive to 
recognize this to a degree, and that the trial process in English law overall exhibits more 
truth formality. They stated that these two varieties of formality, should help generally 
in bringing the law in books closer to the law in action.
12
 English courts, for years  
reluctant to recognize a general duty of good faith in contract law or even to revive the 
doctrine of unconscionable bargains, exhibit this attitude too. However, there is a 
decline of the doctrine of frustration in recent decades as the courts trying to encourage 





English law has tended to place greater emphasis than American law on the 
requirements of certainty and of the sanctity of contract, even though the result of doing 
so might occasionally appear to be harsh to one of the parties. It seems that mitigation 
of such hardship should, in the view of the English courts, be achieved not by a broad 
doctrine of discharge, uncertain in its operation, but by express contractual provisions, 
or, in times of general economic dislocation (e.g. in case of war), athrough special 
legislative intervention.  Others like Roy Goode, recognizes the sturdy nature  and the 
overall strength of English contract law as responsiveness to business expectations, but 
believes that the all-or-nothing approach and limited scope for relief from commercial 
impracticability under the doctrine of frustration is problematic. He does not advocate 
for new generalized principles of good faith and substantive unconscionability into 
English law, but simply argues for a legitimate case for invoking a doctrine of 
substantive unconscionability. He supports the view that it would be inequitable for a 
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party to seek to hold the other to the terms of the original bargain in the light of changed 
circumstances, and reasonable that the court should offer him the choice of 
modification. Goode appeals to continental law in support of this approach, as 
appropriate for meeting business expectations.
14
 On the one hand English law is 
promoting the law in books, whilst on the other hand Japanese and U.S. law, are being 
more receptive to the law in action. However. It should be concluded that economic 
dislocation in contractual relations, in enough to justify “force majeure” and lead to 
renegotiation of contracts. 
 
III.  Business Interruption Insurance   
 
Disruptive events that halt production can have severe business consequences if 
they are not appropriately managed. Business interruption insurance offers businesses a 
financial mechanism for managing their exposure to disruption risk. More specifically, 
business interruption insurance cover provides businesses that have suffered financial 
losses for not operating as a result of loss of revenue from damage to property, due to an 
insured peril. Usually the cover extends to provide for related additional expenses that a 
business has had to incur as a result of the business interruption and for other triggers, 
as well as crisis management expenses. Business interruption cover is obtained as a 
stand-alone cover or as part of a property policy.   
 
Because damage to property is the key element of a business interruption policy, 
a potential issue in arising COVID-19 claims under a business interruption policy, is the 
way in which COVID-19 claims can be linked to ‘damage to property’, as this is a 
prerequisite for the trigger of the standard business interruption cover. Eventhough this 
has not yet been tested in court, however it is possible to have the COVID-19 claims 
linked to ‘damage to property’ where the business interruption as a result of the closure 
of the business is following an order by a public authority. In addition, the obligation to 
notify continues to exist notwithstanding the fact that insurers will be aware of COVID-
19 and its impact worldwide.  
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Because commercial property damage insurance covers losses caused when 
property suffers “physical loss or damage” assureds will have to demonstrate that they 
suffered some form of physical loss or damage to their property, as defined in their 
policies. The way in which such wording applies to the current crisis will be the object 
of future litigation in court. On the one hand the insurers will try to avoid coverage and 
they will argue that policyholders’ losses are not from physical loss or damage to  
property, but have non-physical causes , such as people having to stay home due to 
government measures. In the case of exposure to COVID-19 this threshold will require 
some form of abatement. Any contamination that attaches to the property, or that 
physically affects property so as to render it uninhabitable or unfit for its intended use, 
can constitute physical loss or damage. In a case such as that of a pandemic like the 
COVID-19 the issues to be addressed will continue to shift in terms of their 
interpretation and even if initially the insurers’ initial stance might be unfavourable to 
coverage, the changing circumstances may make room to expand coverage 
possibilities.
15
 In addition, as most business interruption policies require that the 
interruption is caused by loss or damage to property, therefore an issue that likely will 
be litigated is whether the suspected presence of the virus in a location, might constitute 
physical loss or damage. 
Generally, business interruption policies provide that the policyholder must 
suspend operations because of covered peril before collecting its losses. The facts and 
circumstances of each individual case, and coverage often turns on the definition and 
interpretation of the terms and of the language of the policy as the  latter is paramount. 
Business interruption insurance provides coverage for recovery of lost income and 
associated increased costs that a business incurs during a period of interruption to its 
operations that is caused by direct physical loss or damage. Even if at first sight such 
coverage would not seem to be applicable to a COVID-19 loss, if a property needs to be 
closed for decontamination, some policies will provide coverage.  A determination of 
coverage will vary depending on the specific language in each policy and there may be 
sub-limits that apply.  In addition, some policies contain exclusions for both viruses and 
bacteria, while other policies contain exclusions for only bacteria.  Since COVID-19 is a 
virus and not a bacteria, coverage may depend on the language in the policy. 
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The second type of insurance coverage provided for in most business 
interruption policies is “contingent” coverage, which provides coverage for indirect 
losses which generally applies when the business’s supply chain is interrupted and, like 
the direct loss coverage, requires “damage” at the supplier’s location that caused the 
interruption.  As such, the definition of “damage” found in the policy will be crucial.   
  
In addition, there are significant policy enhancements available that may expand 
coverage in some policies, such as: a) civil authority coverage which is triggered when a 
governmental body restricts access to the policyholder’s property and such a provision 
will indicate whether, and how much, the insurer will pay for losses caused by a 
government action or order preventing the policyholder or its customers from accessing 
the property. Insurers will seek to cap these losses by placing a time limit for recovery. 
In addition, such coverage is rapidly changing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
and new form language is currently being drafted for future policies to address closures 
due to coronaviruses;
16
 b) communicable or infectious disease coverage and notifiable 
disease coverage which provide coverage for losses caused by certain diseases without 
the requirement that there be physical damage to the property; c) political risk insurance 
which may provide business interruption coverage for certain losses that arise from the 
actions of foreign governments; d) event insurance coverage, which is an enhancement 




IV. General Liability Insurance 
 
 
General liability insurance typically provides coverage against third party claims 
of property damage or bodily injury. These policies might trigger coverage if a third 
party claimant alleges that an individual contracted COVID-19 due to some act taken or 
not taken by the insured company. In the current state of affairs and the COVID-19 
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pandemic an example would be claims brought against companies that were aware of 
the presence of COVID-19 but ignored information that could have prevented the 
spread.  
General liability policies might also provide coverage for government-mandated 
shutdowns and any related expenses incurred as a result. Insurance companies might 
assert pollution exclusions to deny coverage under general liability policies. Depending 
on the policy language, however, the definition of “bodily injury” is typically broad and 
many pollution exclusions do not specifically reference disease or virus. 
 
a) The Extent and Scope of Liability Coverage 
 
Early reports on COVID-19 included mass infections on cruise ships, or in 
business conferences. Service providers across many industries may be faced with 
claims from customers and the general public that their negligence caused exposure to 
the virus on their premises leading to infection or even death. While some liability 
policies will contain fungi and bacteria exclusions, these exclusions generally are not 
broad enough to exclude coverage for viral infections.    
In addition, physicians who treat patients without observing suggested 
quarantine or self-isolation protocols, or hospitals that do not maintain appropriate 
amounts of staffing or equipment to treat patients in distress may also be vulnerable to 
claims arising out of the pandemic.  In these cases, medical professionals and hospitals 
should look to professionallLiability or errors & omissions insurance coverage for 
mistakes made in providing professional medical services. 
 
b) Proving a loss as a result of the occurrence of business interruption 
The assured needs prove that the loss of revenue and the cessation of business is 
a consequence of a covered cause or event, i.e. in the case of COVID-19 self-isolating 
employees, cancellation of bookings, or government-mandated closure. This proof of 
the cause of the interruption is also necessary for aggregation purposes. However, and 
depending on the exact policy wording, insureds may want to avoid the aggregation of 




Claims for business interruption relate to immediate and direct loss to businesses 
income and turnover as well as other related losses such as from other insured risks, 
such as cancellation of events, higher operation costs, loss of attraction, liability to 
employees and the public, crisis management expenses. To prove the loss incurred the 
assured will need demonstrate previous company turnovers, as well as budgets and 
revenue forecasts for 2020 and subsequent years.  Additional costs related with business 
interruption and consequential losses includes bringing in additional temporary workers 
or third-party contractors, claims preparation costs, contractual penalties, or public 
relations costs.  
Business interruption losses caused by natural and unnatural disasters are 
enormous. In the times of COVID-19 pandemic, and in its aftermath, many businesses 
will resort to business interruption insurance policies, trying to recover loss of business 
and consequential loss of revenue. Even if we set aside the difficulties in determining 
coverage from COVID-19, it is accepted that an insurance policy purchased to cover 
business interruption losses provides little or no recovery because insurers are often 
reluctant to satisfy business interruption claims, as they argue that at times of disasters 
very few customers or clients would have patronized the business following the disaster 
even if the business had not been impacted. Insurers take such a position due to the 
nebulous wording of the loss valuation provisions buried in lengthy, complex, standard 
form business interruption insurance policies. Insurers might also argue that  only the 
pre-catastrophe sales and expenses of the policyholder should be used to value the loss. 
Due to the nebulous wording of the loss valuation, the use of many undefined terms, 
and because a formula for valuing business interruption losses is not actually contained 
in such provisions, the courts’ decisions regarding how business interruption losses 
should be valued are varied and inconsistent. Some courts in the U.S. have accepted the 
argument that the economic conditions post-catastrophe should be considered, others 
not, and there is a disperse approach as to which elements of a business interruption loss 
are recoverable. Some courts have required the policyholder to prove the amount of any 
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In addition, when applying the standard valuation language to claims that arise 
under similar factual scenarios, the courts have reached patently inconsistent 
conclusions regarding which of the policyholder’s ongoing expenses are recoverable. 
One consistency appears in the decisions, i.e. the fact that the courts are confused 
regarding the evidentiary standard that should apply when a policyholder is attempting 




One school of thought, only considers the historical financial data of the 
policyholder when calculating business interruption losses.
19
 Other courts have held that 
local post-catastrophe economic conditions should be considered when business 
interruption losses are valued.
20
 Not least, courts have no guidance and threshold to 
apply regarding the evidentiary standard for business interruption claims. This is not 
surprising because a business interruption loss valuation is an inherently speculative 
exercise and this has caused the courts some consternation when trying to apply 




In trying to interpret and apply policy language such as the loss valuation 
language three well-established rules of policy interpretation are used: (1) contra 
proferentem, (2) the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, and (3) construction of the 
policy as a whole.  
 
In attempting to interpret and apply the valuation provisions of business 
interruption insurance as no loss valuation formula is contained in the provisions, it 
becomes apparent that the provisions are ambiguous when applied. As per  the doctrine 
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of contra proferentem any ambiguities in the policy language should be construed 
against the insurers and in favor of coverage.  
 
As per the reasonable expectations doctrine a policy should be interpreted in 
such a way that even when the policy language unambiguously precludes coverage, 
courts will hold that coverage exists and the policyholder should receive in coverage 
what it objectively can reasonably expect to receive even if the insurer can point to 
some policy language that supports the insurer’s position that the claim at issue should 
not be covered or coverage should be limited, as a policyholder who buys business 
interruption insurance reasonably can expect to receive from its insurer, for the period 
of interruption, the business earnings it had been receiving prior to the catastrophe. In 
other words, courts should not permit insurers to accept premiums for business 
interruption insurance, but then, when a claim is presented, pay the policyholder nothing 
or only a fraction of its business interruption loss, as this would render the coverage 




In addition, the policy should be interpreted as a whole and in a way that 
reconciles its various provisions  whilst giving effect to all of them and keeping the 
general purpose of the insurance in mind. 
 
Hence, with regards to the valuation methods, using only the historical financial 
information ignores some of the policy language on valuation. With regards to post-
catastrophe economic conditions, under the existing rules of policy interpretation, the 
post-catastrophe economic conditions should be considered when they favour the 
policyholder and ignored when they do not.  
 
In addition, because policies are non-negotiated contracts of adhesion with 
standardized language drafted by insurers and are sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
policies should be viewed as akin to products or “things” rather than simply contracts. If 
seen as a product, it is defective if it fails to perform as reasonably expected by the 
assured and the seller, i.e. the insurer is responsible for any harm or damage caused by 
the product. Applied in the business interruption context, the assured expects to be paid 
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the full amount of its loss less the deductible in the event that its business is interrupted. 
If the loss valuation language allows the insurer to pay nothing or less than the full 
amount of the loss, the policy is defective from the policyholder’s perspective. 
Consequently, the policyholder is injured and needs be fully compensated. 
 
It is argued that due to the fact that business interruption policies are adhesion 
contracts where the policyholder does not have the option to negotiate the coverage or 
does not  know of the exact wording, as often no policy copy, hence ambiguities in it 
should be construed in favour of policyholders and against insurers, however such an 
approach can lead to constantly  favouring the policyholders. It is suggested that instead 
of the ad hoc approach that currently exists, a better approach would be to use only the 
prior three years of the policyholder’s historical financial revenue and cost data to value 
such losses. However, the best solution would be to be that courts use the daily loss 
value that already is agreed to by the policyholder and insurer annually during the 
policy renewal underwriting process when the policy is purchased. Under either the 
prior three years of the policyholder’s historical financial revenue and cost data 
approach or under the daily loss value approach, the payment of business interruption 
losses would be consistent, fair, and predictable for both insurers and policyholders.  
  
Any ex gratia payments are not covered and will not be able to be claimed for. 
In addition, insurers will also verify whether the assured has observed his ongoing duty 
to mitigate their losses via reasonable efforts to limit any resulting harm.  
 Where a business interruption policy pays a claim, a business may want to ask 
insurers to make payments on an interim basis, taking into account any applicable 
excesses or limits in indemnity. Due to the nature of viral diseases there can be waves of 
their impact on a business. The wording of any aggregation clauses, could affect the 
way in which an insured notifies a claim and the level of indemnity available to a 
business under a policy. 
c) Exclusions 
The pandemic of COVID-19 will see a rise in claims as a result of which 
insurers will be suffering already heavy losses and will be anticipating further losses in 




exclusions will be sought to be imposed by insurers in business interruption cover.
23
 
Insurers may also attempt to invoke other exclusions - such as the pollution exclusion - 
to avoid covering virus-related losses and claims. Hence, businesses should not assume 
that they are covered for a coronavirus-related loss or claim, as their policy may exclude 
coverage for losses or claims arising out of a "virus" or an "infectious disease."  
The purpose of business interruption coverage is to protect a policyholder’s 
expected income, which would have been earned had there been no interruption of 
business. However, most business interruption policies require that the interruption is 
caused by loss or damage to property. An issue that likely will be litigated in this 
context is whether the suspected presence of the virus in a location, or even the  fact that 
the location is unsafe for its intended use given restrictions on gatherings of people in a 
single location, might constitute physical loss or damage. 
 
Generally, business interruption policies provide that the policyholder must 
suspend operations because of covered peril before collecting its losses. The facts and 
circumstances of each individual case, and coverage often turns on the definition and 
interpretation of the terms and of the language of the policy as the  latter is paramount. 
For example, in 2006, during the international outbreak of “bird flu,” insurers began 
adding exclusions for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus   that 
induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease. What insurers had 
in mind was the SARS outbreak (caused by a different coronavirus from 2003), and 
some policy forms specifically name SARS as an excluded peril. In the times of 
COVID-19, assureds need verify if such an exclusion is in their policy and if it is broad 
enough to apply to their own facts and circumstances. However, even if a virus 
exclusion is included in the policy, laws might be passed enforcing the insurers to pay 
the claims arising from a pandemic even if a virus exclusion exists. As an example, one 
may not the law that the legislature of New Jersey USA is considering  as of 16 March 
2020, which, if passed, would force insurers to pay albeit the existence of virus 
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 In addition, as state regulators might want to protect the policyholders and 
the insurance markets more generally, such exclusions might be inoperable. 
 
V. Travel Insurance 
 
With most airlines cancelling flights and governments closing borders and their 
airspace, travel insurance is a sector well hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. Most policy 
features, definitions, inclusions and exclusions pertinent to COVID-19 fall into the 
epidemic or pandemic category. Trying to buy travel insurance now, means that it is 
unlikely that one will be covered for coronavirus-related medical or cancellation 
expenses, apart from a few exceptions. However it may still be possible for individuals 
to achieve coverage if their insurer offers the option of an add-on cover for cancellation 
for any reason. However, as the pandemic evolves and the situation is changing rapidly, 
policyholders are advised to check with their insurer as to their exact cover available. If 
Government travel advice warnings are elevated to critical and if only essential 
traveling is advisable, then travel insurance cover for leisure purposes will not be 
available. Same if there is a warning Level 4 “Do Not Travel” issued.  
The way in which travel insurance policies treat epidemics and pandemics can 
vary widely. Some policies will exclude epidemics and pandemics altogether. Some 
policies will cover medical costs overseas in relation to pandemics and epidemics, but 
not cancellation costs or loss of bookings, whilst some will cover both medical costs 
overseas and cancellation costs in relation to pandemics and epidemics. 
a) Travel Insurance and the “Known Events” Clause 
If a travel insurance policy contains in its wording a commonly found “known 
events” clause, this could imply that there is no cover for coronavirus-related expenses. 
Most standard form policies, such as travel or other types of insurance  such as home 
and contents insurance, have a “known events” clause, which means that if the event is 
already a known risk when the policy is taken out, the policyholder will not be covered. 
COVID-19 has now been considered a “known event” for weeks.  Policies issued before 
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the pandemic became a 'known event', might offer cover depending on the policy 
wording. 
Cancellation of travel due to fear of contracting COVID-19 will not imply cover 
of the costs of cancelling, unless there has been a “do not travel” warning for the 
country or region to be visited after the insurance policy was issued. In addition, if a “do 
not travel” warning has  been issued for the country or region to be visited and the 
policyholder decides to travel to that place, the insurance will not provide cover. It 
should be noted that lower-level warnings, like “reconsider your need to travel” should 





VI. Liability for Catastrophic Risks and Methods of Compensation 
 
Steps can be taken to limit the human impact of catastrophic natural or 
unnatural, such as a pandemic, disasters. However, as harm to human life and property 
cannot be completely avoided, the issue of compensation arises. The legal system 
provides a mix of public and private sector methods, albeit with limitations, for 
compensating victims of natural disasters.   
The first method of compensation is private insurance. This method is limited by 
hurdles such as the unavailability of such insurance coverage due to the expense or 
underwriting risks, exclusion of catastrophic risks by contract, and the difficulty of 
handling very large numbers of claims create significant hurdles.
 
 Another method of 
compensation is litigation against responsible private parties, which also has its 
limitations such as the need for proof of negligence or the potential limits on the 
financial assets and insurance coverage of potential defendants. Third, there is the 
possibility of government generated compensation either via tort claims for negligence 
(subject to immunity defenses); claims under special compensation schemes established 




compensation for the taking of property.
25
 In the case of COVID-19, the first and third 
methods apply. 
More specifically, our exposure to the COVID-19 involves an element of 
widespread contamination of the public. Courts have frequently addressed 
contamination and have struggled with proximate causation establishment  which has 
proven to be of the biggest barriers to tort recovery. In large scale environmental 
contamination cases the problem has often been identified as failing to establish a link 
between a disease and exposure to a substance as a causation element. By analogy, in 
the case of COVID-19 exposure to the virus has to be established and the issue arises on 
how to link and prove such exposure. In such cases courts might follow the approach of 
proportional recovery to all victims. In relation to COVID-19 medical monitoring 
claims which may arise will include the treatment of the disease and related expenses. 
In medical monitoring cases, a traditional common-law lump sum of monetary damages 
is awarded, whilst in toxic exposure cases, periodic payment of future medical 
surveillance expenses out of a court-supervised trust fund or similar mechanism has 
been often adjudicated and awarded.
26 
Remedial innovation is one way to deal with the 
issues posed by major risks. An analogy in the case of COVID-19 would be to provide 
compensation for all medical and crisis management, business interruption, worker 
compensation and other related expenses. 
 In addition, similar to asbestos cases, in relation to COVID-19 which can be 
classified as another form of environmental contamination, the epidemiological models 
at the moment are frightening. Another difficulty is that there is no cure or therapy at 
the moment, hence no estimate of medical costs claims can be made.   
 In the case of COVID-19, government schemes for mass catastrophic disasters 
are put in place. The ABA guidelines in the USA dictate in principle 7 the provision of 
reasonable compensation or additional disaster assistance to individual persons affected 
by a major disaster for losses when public authorities determine that it is in the public 
interest to do so in cases where neither insurance coverage nor judicial action is likely to 
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provide reimbursement for losses to persons affected by a major disaster. Such 
reasonable assistance is detected where public authorities are responsible, through their 
action or inaction, for the disaster event or where public authorities determine that a 
remedy traditionally available either through the operation of the judicial system or 
otherwise should not be made available or should be severely curtailed.
 27
  
  Post 9/11 a special victim’s compensation fund was established, covering 
medical expenses, loss of earnings, loss of business or employment opportunities and 
non-economic loss such as physical and emotional pain.
 
Such  a legislative 
compensation mechanism does not exclude common law liability, as Stanford v. Kuwait 
Airways Corporation
28 
 and In re September 11 Litigation
29
 have demonstrated. 
However, insurance for terrorism risks has also been supported by the government 
interventions and catastrophe liability works also as a means of risk spreading 
organizations, as in the case of catastrophic risks liability can allow society to tap the 
unmatched ability of insurers to compensate adequately.
30
  
Stanford v Kuwait Airways Corporation
31  
involved the hijacking of a Kuwait 
airlines flight. In the law suit that followed, the claimants asserted that the airline’s 
negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries and deaths occurring aboard the flight 
as when the airline boarded connecting passengers in Beirut, it knew or should have 
known that some might be terrorists. Kuwait Airlines had a duty towards the plaintiffs, 
as its duty as per the court’s findings was to protect passengers on connecting flights 
from unreasonable risks. A related issue was the foreseeability of the specific injury that 
occurred as there was evidence that the airline knew of the threatened attacks by 
Hezbollah terrorists and that terrorists were boarding flights in airports to infiltrate 
connecting flights. The case of In re September 11 Litigation
32
 involved opt-outs from 
the compensation fund. The defendants included the airlines, airport security 
companies, and airport operators all of which had negligently failed their security 
responsibilities.
 
The court held that the airlines and security companies owed a duty of 
care to victims on the ground to screen passengers and their belongings and that the 
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plane crash was within the class of foreseeable hazards outcomes. The court took into 
account factors such as the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the 
proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, 
disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the 
expansion or limitation of new channels of liability.
 
The rationale of the court lied in 
that the scope of duty to a particular class of plaintiffs depends on the relationship to 
such plaintiffs, whether plaintiffs were within a zone of foreseeable harm, and whether 
the harm was within the class of reasonably foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to 
prevent. In order to be considered foreseeable, the precise manner in which the harm 
was inflicted need not be perfectly predicted.
33 
 
In considering the desirability of compensation for catastrophic risks, we need to 
take the societal interests at stake into account. Catastrophic losses are precisely the 
kinds of risk for which loss-spreading through some kind of insurance scheme seems 
most warranted. Yet, private insurance coverage for victims is problematic. Hence, the 
need for disaster prevention measures. Corrective justice is an explorable solution as it 
allows in the case of large-scale risks where specific individuals who were at fault for a 
catastrophic loss often will not have the resources to cover more than a small portion of 
the damages, the imposing of liability indirectly on taxpayers is also a tool for 
administering liability for catastrophic risks. As the insurance industry seems often 
reluctant to provide coverage for large-scale natural disasters, government interventions 
are needed to cover for the inability of private insurance markets to operate in the cases 
of catastrophic risks, and this is viable through risk spreading. Imposing  liability for 
catastrophic risks can deter undesirable conduct and reinforce the society’s limited 
ability to spread the costs of catastrophe. However, where it may not be feasible to 
compensate all victims of catastrophic risks, it is necessary to limit the class of victims 
to those with the most catastrophic losses.The unavailability of full compensation does 
not mean that all compensation should be denied.
34
 Similarly, various governments, in 
the wake of COVID-19 pandemic have started putting in place similar legislative 
compensation mechanisms, and others will continue in the aftermath of the pandemic. 
Such public scheme intervention will help the insurance industry spread the risk and be 
able to respond to it, and the society to continue to operate. 
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The legal landscape for insurance coverage for losses associated with COVID-
19 will evolve as the outbreak progresses and claims are submitted. The terms and 
conditions of policies vary from insurer to insurer and client to client. Although many 
“standard” policy forms may contain exclusions for viruses, others will not. Assureds 
need examine their insurance policies and their particular circumstances and specific 
terms of coverage, as they may be already in need to file insurance claims for losses 
resulting from business interruptions as a result of COVID-19, or may be unable to 
renew their contracts or have to pay scrupulous premium increases combined with 
additional restrictions on coverage. The uncertainties surrounding liability for COVID-
19 will make these claims and renewals as well as policy renewal negotiations even 
more challenging.  
  
As the world continues to address the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 
an important aspect of managing the response to COVID-19 includes a comprehensive 
review of insurance with an eye toward identifying coverage that may be available to 
mitigate losses incurred due to the pandemic and government orders arising from the 
pandemic. Any rushed, definitive or misleading pronouncements about coverage, or the 
lack thereof, for losses arising out of COVID-19 are not advisable as no clear cut 
answers may exist and hence a more measured approach is needed.
35  As our discussion 
has shown, legislative compensation mechanisms set up by governments will help 
spread the risk and provide holistic compensation solutions, the resort to private insurers 
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